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sources there was a known shortage of office space from supply restrictions, the restrictions on the 
supply of housing were substantially more severe. 
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I. Introduction 
This paper examines the impact on office prices of the granting, in 2013, of new rights to convert 
office buildings to housing without the need to seek explicit permission. The background to this was, 
and is, the severe and longstanding constraint on the supply of housing in Britain in general and 
London, in particular. Constraints on the supply of housing, indeed all development, derive from the 
very restrictive system of land use regulation operational in England and Wales since the 1947 Town 
and Country Planning Act but tightening from 1955 with the introduction of the first Green Belt around 
London. That covered an area extending from the North Sea to Aylesbury, 60 kms North West of 
London, effectively preventing all new development over the whole area.  
Cheshire and Sheppard, 2002, had already shown that in more restrictive communities in South East 
England there was a substantial net welfare loss, estimated to be equivalent to an income tax rate of 
nearly 4 percent1, with the costs mainly deriving from ‘containment policies’. Their analysis has been 
updated and supplemented by further studies such as that by Hilber and Vermeulen (2016) and Koster 
and Zabihidan (2019). Both these confirm the basic finding that restrictive planning policies constrain 
the supply of land and of housing, substantially raising its price and, in the case of the Koster and 
Zabihidan study, reducing welfare. 
Underpinning the English system is the separation of the right to develop from other rights associated 
with freehold tenure. The 1947 Act expropriated these development rights so they were controlled by 
the state.  Control of development is exercised by political committees of local government (Local 
Planning Authorities - LPAs) making discretionary decisions. So, unlike Zoning in the US or the 
European Master Planning system, all decisions concerning significant development proposals are 
individual and, within the framework set by legislation, unpredictable. The English system relies on 
legally defined ‘use classes’ and changing any property’s use class is legally defined as ‘development’ 
and requires specific permission. So building on a previously undeveloped site or converting an office 
into apartments requires a formal proposal and explicit permission from the LPA.  
There are national planning guidelines, as, for example set out in the National Planning Policy 
Framework (2012) or policies identifying ‘Green Belts’, National Parks, Areas of Outstanding Natural 
Beauty or Sites of Special Scientific Interest - on which all development is effectively prohibited. 
Green Belts, in particular, restrict the supply of land around major cities where demand is highest (see 
Cheshire, 2018). Most policies, however, including Green Belt designation, are at the discretion of the 
lowest tier of government, the Local Authority. 
The power of LPAs to refuse proposals for development is a powerful influence restricting supply. 
Hilber and Vermeulen (2016) concluded that if the South East (the most tightly regulated English 
region) had accepted the same proportion of proposals as the North East of England (less regulated, 
but still restrictive by world standards), house prices in the South East would have been some 30% 
lower in 2015. Moreover, these are lower bound estimates for several reasons, including the fact that 
restrictions were already affecting prices in their base year, 1974.  Overall real house prices – but not 
real incomes – have grown faster in the UK over the last 40 years than in any other OECD country 
(Hilber and Vermeulen, 2016). 
Given that the planning system operates on the basis that all development requires explicit permission 
from the LPA then the opportunity to develop without permission might be expected to have a 
1 See Cheshire and Sheppard, 2002, Table 6.2. 
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significant impact. This is what a change introduced in 2013 (DCLG 2013a) did. It permitted the 
conversion of offices into housing without permission, introducing a new ‘permitted development right 
(PDR)’. While this new PDR applied to most of the country, helpfully zones in central London and 
Manchester, traditional office centres, were excluded. This makes it possible to estimate with some 
precision the impact the new PDR had on the price of offices. 
In what follows we apply a spatial difference in difference approach to estimate the price premium for 
office buildings entitled to the PDR. To do this we use data for some 2,000 office sales over the period 
2009 to 2016, bridging the introduction of the PDR. We find that the new ability to convert offices to 
housing without need for planning permission increased the price of such offices by some 50 percent. 
Previous research (Cheshire and Hilber, 2008; Cheshire & Dericks, 2020) has already shown that the 
price of office space in London has been substantially increased by planning imposed supply 
restrictions. Cheshire and Hilber (2008) estimated that the mean Regulatory Tax (measured as the 
percentage mark-up of price over construction cost per unit area) for the period 1999 to 2005 was 
between 330 and 810 percent in London office zones to which the PDR was not applied. In the 
comparatively unrestricted contexts of New York or Brussels, comparable values were 50 and 68 
percent respectively. Most relevant for the present results, in the London Borough of Hammersmith, 
an area to which the PDR when introduced in 2013 did apply, the Regulatory Tax had still been 
estimated at 220 percent, implying a substantial restriction on the supply of office space (see Cheshire 
and Hilber, 2008, Table 2) in even this subsidiary London office location.  
The estimated 50 percent premium conferred on offices eligible to convert to housing use by the new 
PDR demonstrates, therefore, that while the supply of office space in London might have been 
restricted by the planning system, it was very much less restricted than was the supply of housing. 
Moreover it strongly suggests that it was primarily planning restrictions which caused the higher price 
of housing since the change only affected the ability to by-pass those restrictions. This has to be 
somewhat qualified, however, since the housing created in the former offices to which the PDR applied 
did not have to conform to design requirements that would have applied had standard planning 
procedures been in operation.  
Evidence demonstrating the impact of regulatory constraints on land prices and housing affordability 
is not confined to the UK. It is also well documented in the US, especially on the East and West coasts 
(Glaeser and Gyourko 2003, Glaeser et al., 2005, Quigley and Raphael, 2005, Albouy and Ehrlich, 
2018, or Turner et al., 2014). The impact in Britain appears to be even more substantial, however. 
Moreover the evidence showing that supply restrictions imposed by the planning system also impact 
the price of office space, the form of offices (Cheshire and Dericks, 2020) or the supermarket sector 
(Cheshire et al., 2015) appears to be confined to Britain. The findings reported here add to this 
evidence showing that the economic effects of restrictive land use regulation in Britain are extreme 
and spread to more sectors of real estate than is the case elsewhere in the world. 
The paper is structured as follows: we start by explaining in more detail how the British planning 
system works and how, within this system, the Permitted Development Rights to convert some office 
structures to residential use, worked. We then define and describe the data used. The next sections 
discuss some theoretical considerations and our methodology and then set out the model we test. 
Section VI then describes the main results followed by a section describing some of the robustness 
tests and alternative specifications we ran. Section VIII concludes. 
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II. The British Planning System: Permitted Development Rights
The British planning system differs from the rules-based systems commonly implemented elsewhere2, 
such as the USA’s zoning system or the continental Europe’s Master Planning system. In Britain, the 
Town and Country Planning Act of 1947 expropriated landowners of the right to develop, redevelop, 
or change the legal use of the land or buildings3 they owned without the explicit approval of the state 
(Evans and Hartwich, 2005). The probability that any application to develop will be approved varies 
systematically across the country (Hilber and Vermeulen 2016). If a project is rejected this can be 
appealed in a quasi-judicial process first to the Planning Inspectorate and ultimately to the government 
minister responsible for the planning system. Thus all decisions about development are uncertain 
because they are political decisions, so subject to lobbying and the personal tastes or prejudices of 
local representatives: moreover, only a minority of LPAs in fact have an up to date local plan and such 
plans are not binding (see Cheshire and Carozzi, 2019). So not only are all decisions uncertain but they 
are also gameable. Appeals or lobbying involve further investment of time, resources, and money and 
there is no guarantee of success. This introduces additional risk and uncertainty to the development 
process: risks which further reduce housing supply (Mayo and Sheppard 2001).  
‘Permitted development rights’ (PDR) refer to those changes between use classes that Parliament 
permits as a right. Such changes of use, therefore, do not need individual project approval. In January 
2013, (DCLG 2013(a)), the Government announced the introduction of new PDR allowing change of 
use from office4 to residential (Smith 2015). The rights were initially temporary5, for a period of three 
years from May 30th 2013 (CBRE Planning 2013). They were applicable across England but 
fortunately for this paper there were areas of exemption, notably in some specific areas of London and 
Manchester deemed to be key office locations. To improve our estimates of the impact the new PDR 
had on values, we focus just on exempt and entitled buildings in central London, thereby improving 
likely matching and reducing, so far as possible, the potential for geographical factors to skew results. 
London’s exempt areas where the PDRs did not apply are shown in Figure 16. These exemption areas 
followed idiosyncratic boundaries and were supposed to protect selected highly agglomerated 
commercial clusters and to prevent the loss of core office stock in prime markets. As with all PDRs, 
local authorities had the right to appeal against the change of use by applying for a so-called ‘Article 
4 direction’ to remove the entitlement. These were difficult to obtain, however7. There is no systematic 
data allowing us to account for such cases where the PDR was overridden, although a CBRE study 
2 British-style discretionary systems have been exported to some countries formerly dependent on the U.K. New Zealand’s 
planning system, for example, embodies many of the same features and generates similarly unaffordable housing. Housing 
in Auckland (surrounded by an extensive containment or green belt zone) competes to be the most unaffordable in the 
world (Cox and Pavletich, 2019).
3 There are legally defined ‘use classes’ and changing the use of any land or building from one use class to another legally 
constitutes development so requires explicit permission from the LPA. 
4 The use class ‘office space’ is defined as B1(a), which refers to all office space excluding that which is occupied for 
research and development, industrial, or banks, buildings societies, and other services which the public generally have 
access to. Residential is defined as C3, which refers to buildings where 6 or fewer people live together as a single household 
(ARUP 2014). 
5 The rights were made permanent in October 2015. 
6 Map taken from CBRE Planning 2013, and reproduced with the written permission of the CBRE Planning department. 
7 The reluctance of the government to approve Article 4 directions is clear from the following written statement made by 
the former planning minister Nick Boles (2014): “Ministers are minded to cancel Article 4 directions which seek to re-
impose unjustified or blanket regulation, given the clearly stated public policy goal of liberalizing the planning rules and 
helping provide more homes… Ministers wish to send a clear message to the housing industry that we will act to provide 
certainty, confidence and clarity, and that we are supporting their investment in these new homes to bring under-used 
property back into productive use as housing.” 
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(CBRE Planning 2013) reports a very low success rate of appeals, suggesting that the results reported 
here will be little affected by the potential Article 4 direction. 
III. Data
Data on office characteristics and transactions are taken from the CoStar Group. This source is widely 
used commercially and has been used in previous academic studies of commercial property (for an 
early example, see Eicholtz et al., 2010). CoStar’s data (CoStar. 2017) contains transaction, leasing, 
and building information for each commercial building, and is widely regarded as a consistently 
updated and reliable source of information.  
The dataset used in the analysis is a panel, spanning twelve London boroughs from 2009 to 2016. The 
areas covered are shown in Figures 1 and 2.  The sample period, from 1st January to end 2016, gives a 
near symmetric timeframe either side of the policy announcement and reduces various other problems 
including the cyclicality of the commercial property market. Data were extracted for every commercial 
building registered on CoStar wholly or partly designated as office space (either B1 or A2 use)8. Each 
observation has a field for transaction date and price, address, and many individual building 
characteristics, including a CoStar specific measure: the ‘star rating’. This measure grades buildings 
from 1 to 5 according to an overall assessment of their physical attributes, including performance, 
construction, energy efficiency and design. This is a useful control, as it proxies for a large number of 
difficult to observe building characteristics. The star rating is independent of location, so it can be 
included in the regression without introducing multicollinearity.  
Samples and variables are defined in Table 1 and descriptive statistics for the ‘Core’ sample in Table 
3. Over the period of interest, 2009 to 2016, there were 14,875 recorded building ‘transactions’ with
office space in them across all boroughs and years. Only a minority of these transactions had a recorded 
price, however, so dropping those with no price reduced the sample size to 3,842. The spatial 
distribution of the groups of observations by borough is shown in Table 2. Column (1) relates to the 
whole sample; column (2) to all observations with a recorded price. Columns (3) to (4) show the same 
information for respectively those observations with complete information including price (the ‘full 
sample’), omitting those buildings which were not in sole office use (for example, had retail or 
residential premises within them) and finally the ‘core’ sample, excluding buildings officially Listed 
as of historic interest or outstanding architectural merit. These are excluded since they are subject to 
stringent controls preventing any changes either external or internal, so making conversion to 
residential use a very different commercial proposition, indeed perhaps impossible. 
Buildings exempt from the PDR were identified manually, using maps of each borough which defined 
the exemption zone boundaries (DCLG 2013(b)). Each observation was located on a digital map by 
postcode and matched to the relevant boundary map. A binary variable ‘Entitled’ was constructed, 
with a value of 1 assigned to buildings exempt from the PDR entitlement. Some boroughs (City of 
8 The data does not define which of these observations are B1(a), Offices, so subject to the PDR, as compared to A2, 
premises of Banks, Building Societies or Professional services. If we are able to assume that other buildings in the sample 
experienced similar trends between the control and treatment groups over the period in question, the only effect the 
inclusion of this data will have is to negatively bias the magnitude of the coefficient on the exemption effect. In other 
words, since there is no reason to believe that other buildings should have displayed divergent trends within what happens 
to be the exemption zone for B1(a) buildings, their inclusion will only underestimate the premium found in this study. A 
better dataset, which extracted only B1(a) buildings, might therefore be expected to yield even stronger relative value 
increases for entitled buildings.    
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London and Kensington & Chelsea) were entirely exempt, and so all observations were assigned a 
value of 1 instantly. However other boroughs, notably Westminster, Hackney, Islington and Tower 
Hamlets, had exemption zones intended to identify less economically significant office locations 
(Figure 1), and so were more cumbersome to assign. While this made assignment more difficult, it 
created a quasi-experimental setting, with greater geographic mixing of exempt and non-exempt 
buildings. Furthermore, a BCO (2015) report states that the exemption boundaries were sometimes 
determined by legal or practical factors, rather than solely economic ones. This enables closer 
matching of exempt and entitled buildings, as economic factors will be more highly correlated with 
transaction price than legal or practical ones.  
Finally, some neighbourhood level controls were identified to explain some of the transaction price 
variation. The refusal rate of major residential projects as a measure of planning restrictiveness across 
boroughs was used by Hilber and Vermeulen 2016, and was found to be an important causal influence 
on variations in house prices across LAs.  It is included here, interacted with entitlement, to see whether 
the premium for the PDR was greater for office buildings in more restrictive boroughs where the 
relative restriction on housing supply might have been greater. A number of studies (see Cheshire and 
Dericks, 2020, for example) have found office prices are higher, the higher is the local density of office 
based employment. So that, too, is included using data from (Nomis 2011). The borough level 
unemployment rate (London Poverty Profile 2015) is also included in some models as an indicator of 
local prosperity although, given that the spatial limits of London’s housing market extend widely, 
prosperity at the borough level may not be significant. In addition, fixed effects are included for the 
Postcode ‘outcode’ level: that is the area defined by the part of the alphanumeric British Postcode 
before the space. We have observations in 119 outcodes 
IV. Theoretical considerations
If the real estate market were in equilibrium and uses were freely interchangeable, then one would 
expect that at the margin, prices of office and housing space would be equal. That would be true 
independently of whether on average it costs more to build housing than offices or vice versa once 
costs of conversion had been taken into account. Given, however, that uses are not interchangeable 
because of the way in which the British Planning system works, a price differential could emerge. The 
supply of space for each category of use is independently determined by administrative fiat and does 
not take account of their relative prices, so if the balance of demand and supply for the categories 
differs, then a price differential will arise at the margin of use whether that margin refers to a spatial 
boundary or a ‘quality’ margin. The size of any such price differential would reflect the relative 
scarcity of the two categories of space.  
We have independent evidence of a restriction on the supply relative to demand of both office and 
housing space in London (Cheshire and Hilber, 2008; Hilber and Vermeulen, 2016) so a priori we 
cannot say whether the entitlement to the PDR would or would not generate a premium. If office space 
was in relatively more restricted supply, there would be no impact on the price of office space since 
there would be no incentive to convert it to residential use (subject to the proviso that the office space 
in question was fit for purpose). If housing space is more restricted relative to demand than is office 
space then when the PDR was introduced a premium for office buildings entitled to be converted 
should emerge. It is thus an empirical question and the measurement of any premium for the PDR-
entitled office space, provided it is robustly and consistently estimated, would be evidence that the 
shortage of housing in London was even greater than that of offices: its size would be an indicator of 
the extent of that differential shortage. 
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Entitled buildings in areas which have more pronounced shortages of residential supply relative to 
commercial supply could benefit from an even higher value growth than similar entitled buildings in 
areas where the difference in supply shortages of residential and commercial space is narrower 
depending on the elasticity of substitution in London’s housing market across boroughs.  
Finally, subject to conversion costs, office space should only be lost to residential use to the point 
where it is valued equally to residential use, and competing land uses are in equilibrium. Over time 
this should moderate any major, prolonged imbalances as developers have both greater incentive and 
ability than policy makers to respond to value changes.  
V. Methodology 
Entitlement to the PDR is a binary characteristic which applies to some, but not all buildings in the 
sample. As such, difference in difference methods can be employed to estimate its value. The 
exemption zones, with their somewhat idiosyncratic boundaries, create an environment where the 
policy is geographically discontinuous, thereby creating a quasi-experimental setting with distinct 
treatment and control groups. The treatment group consists of all buildings entitled to the rights, and 
the control group consists of all buildings without such entitlement. The data spans approximately 3 
to 4 years either side of the policy announcement and introduction, and by measuring trends in 
transaction prices between treated and untreated buildings, one can identify any change in trend 
observed post treatment either to the announcement, or the introduction of, PDR.  
The policy was formally announced on January 24th 2013 and introduced on May 30th 2013. Given the 
forward-looking nature of investors, a bigger response might be expected following announcement 
than introduction. It is known from studies of other related phenomena that expected future values of 
relevant variables are capitalised into land prices: see for example, Cheshire and Sheppard, 2004 or 
Mense and Kholodilin, 2014. However, there was necessarily uncertainty as to the exact delimitations 
of exemption zones and timings; indeed there could have even been uncertainty as to whether the 
policy would be introduced at all. This would at least have reduced any value investors might have 
attached to the potential value of the new PDR when formally announced. Indeed, to further complicate 
the identification of a clear cut date for the policy to have had an impact on prices, it had been 
announced, in principle, nearly a year earlier in the March 2011 Budget (DCLG 2012). The result is 
that the announcement effect may have been graduated over time as belief in the reality of the policy 
increased as, too, did knowledge of its details.  
In light of these considerations we further focus on the introduction date of May 30th 2013. However, 
identifying the appropriate ‘treatment’ date is complicated by the financial and administrative lags 
inherent in commercial property transactions, which cause transactions to be completed (and therefore 
be recorded) up to several months after a transaction price has been offered and agreed. Taking a crude 
average lag between offer and completion dates of eight weeks, we therefore, select July 25th 2013 as 
the most plausible treatment date. If eight weeks is a good estimate of the mean period between 
accepted offer and legal completion, the average building recorded by CoStar as being sold on or after 
July 25th will have been under offer on or after May 30th. We have also experimented with other 
possible ‘treatment’ dates including eight weeks after the announcement date: the results of this 
alternative treatment date are reported in Table 5 while the main results, those for a treatment date of 
July 25th 2013 are shown in Table 4.  
The fundamental specification is given below. The natural log of the most recent transaction price is 
regressed on the interaction of the dummy variables ‘Post’ and ‘Entitled’ - which takes a value of 1 
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only when a building is both entitled to the PDR and sold after the chosen treatment date. This 
interaction isolates the effect of entitlement, and is consequently called the ‘entitlement effect’. The 
specification also includes a dummy variable ‘Post’ which takes a value of 1 for all buildings transacted 
after the treatment date, and therefore identifies the time trend in the price of all buildings, and a 
dummy variable ‘Entitled’, which takes a value of 1 if the building is entitled to the PDR. This 
coefficient therefore estimates the price differential of the treated buildings without controlling for 
time. A range of controls is included, and the error term is denoted by 𝜀𝑖𝑡. 
log (𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡) = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐸𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑙𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐸𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑙𝑒𝑑 + {𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠} + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
A fixed effects model is employed on the panel data, with transactions observed across 12 boroughs 
and 8 years. As noted above fixed effects are defined at the Postcode ‘outcode’ level. This is a small 
enough area for the office buildings within it to be reasonably similar in unobservables (consistent 
with this judgement is the fact that no outcode area contains both entitled and non-entitled buildings). 
On the other hand outcodes are large enough for each to contain sufficient observations. As prices in 
two adjacent outcodes may be jointly affected by proximate unobservable characteristics, standard 
errors are clustered at the ‘Exempt’ level. The controls can be divided into three distinct categories: 
neighbourhood level, individual level, and time trends. Neighbourhood level controls include factors 
that vary by boroughs, such as planning restrictiveness, office based employment, and the 
unemployment rate. Individual level controls include age, star rating, rentable building area, typical 
floor size, percentage leased, number of elevators and number of floors. Only the results for the main 
controls are reported in the tables.  
Additionally dummy variables for each year were included to control for time trends in commercial 
property and the wider economy, and quarterly dummies were included to control for within-year 
seasonality of transactions.  
VI. Results
Table 4 details the main results, with an identical specification run on three samples. The variable 
‘Entitlement effect’ measures the causal impact on value growth of being entitled to the PDR. This 
impact is very highly positive and statistically significant in all samples, with a 52 percent higher value 
associated with buildings entitled to the PDR in the full sample (1) and a 51 percent increase if 
buildings not in sole office use are excluded (2). The core sample (3) removes all transactions of 
buildings which are excluded from the PDR even in entitled zones, which could confound the analysis. 
The finding in this sample is a 46 percent higher growth rate for entitled buildings, statistically 
significant at the 10% level. Weaker significance is to be expected due to the decreased number of 
observations. All else equal, buildings qualifying for the PDR exhibited a premium following their 
introduction. 
On the whole, coefficients on the remaining regressors perform as expected. There are substantial, 
statistically significant higher transaction prices associated with selling the building after March 2013, 
as suggested by the findings for the variable ‘Post’. This is consistent with the strengthening of the 
commercial market typical of a post-recession recovery period. All else equal, entitled buildings were 
found to sell for 70 to 100 percent less, consistent with the diagnosis that the PDR buildings tended to 
be in secondary locations and/or have other negative but unobserved characteristics so be subject to a 
discount. The level of local authority restrictiveness, as measured by the refusal rate, although both 
here and in the results reported in Table 6 mainly has the expected sign, is never statistically significant. 
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Local office based employment has a very high, positive, and statistically significant effect on 
transaction prices across all samples. This is intuitive given that higher office based employment in a 
borough will be an indicator of localised agglomeration economies.  
A unitary increase in the star rating raises building value by 65 to 68 percent across samples and is 
always statistically significant at the 1 percent level. Age, which would also be expected to have an 
impact, is negligible and not statistically different from zero, but the benefits of a newer building are 
likely to be largely captured by the star rating variable. The effects of the rentable floor area is 
significant in the anticipated way but the number of floors is not, although it is positive and significant 
in some of the alternative specifications, independently of the building’s floor area, echoing results 
from the emerging ‘tall buildings’ literature (see Koster at al., 2014 or Ahlfeldt and Mcmillen 2018). 
There is also evidence to suggest the number of elevators independently raises transaction price. 
Building occupancy, as measured by percent leased, displays a small, negative impact on transaction 
price, which is counterintuitive. The explanation may be that CoStar provides the current occupancy 
of each building, not the percentage leased at the time of sale. 
VII. Robustness
Having obtained the main body of results, the next step is to investigate how these findings hold under 
a variety of changes to the specification. The main robustness checks are changing the treatment date, 
excluding various controls, and excluding the most central and peripheral observations. 
Table 5 presents the findings when the treatment date is changed from July 25th 2013 (8 weeks after 
the introduction) to March 22nd 2013 (8 weeks after the announcement) for each sample. As expected, 
the findings generally suggest a smaller price effect, as the policy was not a surprise to the industry 
when it was formally announced, and uncertainties still remained as to the exact boundaries of the 
zones which would be entitled. In the full sample entitled buildings experienced 36 percent higher 
value growth, statistically significant at the 1% level, while in the core sample entitled buildings 
experienced 23 percent higher value growth, although this finding is statistically insignificant. The 
main specifications were repeated using a randomised treatment date (as in Votsis and Perrels, 2016). 
No statistically significant coefficient was found for 𝛽1, the variable of interest, indicating that the 
value divergence recorded post 2013 was not a temporal coincidence.  
The main specification was adjusted to exclude certain controls and test alternative methods for 
controlling for time fixed effects. Results for the full 2009-2016 and core samples are presented in 
Table 6. Columns (1) and (3) exclude several individual level controls which reduces both the 
magnitude and statistical significance of the findings for both the full and the core samples. Therefore 
even though the excluded controls were only weakly significant or insignificant in earlier 
specifications, in combination they contributed to some building-level variation in price. On the other 
hand, controlling for time trends by interacting quarter and year dummies, as in columns (2) and (4), 
yields results very similar in magnitude and significance to the main findings, a 46 to 48 percent 
premium for PDR-entitled buildings, statistically significant at the 1 percent. 
The final adjustment which is undertaken is to remove sections of the sample which might be least 
matched to other observations. The most central buildings are likely to have the most substantial 
location value, and therefore their potential entitled value may not be accurately represented by the 
outer-middle observations. Similarly, the most peripheral observations do not realistically provide a 
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fitting counterfactual for boundary locations. The most central and the most peripheral outcodes are 
dropped from the basic sample, ensuring that observations are closer to the boundary, and therefore 
more closely matched. Table 7 presents results for each of the full and core samples when inner city 
observations are removed, when peripheral observations are removed, and when both are removed, 
leaving a ‘circular band’ of observations (Figure 2). Entitlement causes high value growth in all three 
cases across both samples, with mixed levels of statistical significance (likely to be due to inadequate 
sample sizes, especially in the case of the core sample). The magnitude of the finding falls when the 
innermost observations are dropped, and rises when peripheral observations are dropped, suggesting 
that the residential-commercial land price differential is highest in central locations. The sample of 
adequate size and the least geographical variation amongst its observations – column (3) – yields an 
estimated 54 percent premium for entitled buildings, statistically significant at the 5 percent level.   
VIII. Conclusion
The main findings of this paper indicate that buildings that became entitled to the PDR to convert from 
office to residential use experienced an economically and a statistically significant increase in value 
compared to those that were not. Our estimates of this conversion premium vary according to 
specification but is around 50 percent in our main results. In other specifications of varying plausibility 
they span this value. So, results are relatively stable.   
There is independent evidence that the supply of office space is severely restricted in London (see 
Cheshire and Hilber, 2008). For the zones covered by our sample of offices here, the regulatory tax 
they estimated varied by location and with the property cycle but the mean value for the period 1999 
to 2005 as a percentage mark-up on marginal construction costs ranged from 219 (Hammersmith) to 
809 (West End). While the evidence is that the supply of office space in London was restricted, the 
evidence we have analysed here suggests the supply of residential space was very much more strongly 
restricted. The 50 percent premium we estimate as being paid for those offices which became subject 
to the right to convert them into residential use without planning permission being required, is evidence 
of that. 
The 50 percent premium was a direct measure of the value of the right to convert but two further 
factors need to be taken into account when interpreting it as the ‘price of housing relative to office 
space shortage’. On the one had the developer was buying a right to convert but still had to incur 
significant construction and financing costs to physically convert and market the structures. On the 
other hand, since it was not necessary to apply for planning permission both the quality – so costs of 
construction – may have been reduced and the uncertainty associated with the process of applying for 
planning permission was eliminated. So it was much easier for a developer to forecast the returns from 
the premium paid. These two factors will have opposite effects on the value of the premium paid for 
PDR-entitled buildings but we do not know their respective sizes, so cannot judge the precise extent 
to which they offset each other. 
This study has significant implications for planning policy. Its results reinforce the findings of the 
existing literature to demonstrate the degree of planning restrictiveness on housing supply: especially 
in London, and especially since the shortage of office space is itself most significant in London. Clearly 
there is scope for further investigation: it should be possible to test and quantify the extent to which 
housing units generated by the PDR were discounted compared to ‘normal’ housing space in 
comparable locations. It would also be of interest to see if there were further value changes as a result 
of making the rights permanent in April 2016. Nevertheless the results reported in this paper fit into a 
clear pattern of the causes of the housing affordability crisis in Britain with its epicentre in London. 
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TABLES 
Table 1: Sample and Variable Definitions 
Sample 
Full (2009-2016) All transactions with a recorded transaction price on buildings with any office use between January 2009 and February 2016 
Sole Use (2009-2016) All transactions between same dates excluding any buildings with a secondary use such as retail or residential 
Core (2009-2016) All transactions between same dates excluding transactions of both listed buildings and buildings with a secondary use 
Variable 
Entitlement Effect A binary variable with a value of 1 if the transactions was on a PDR-entitled building and occurred after chosen pivotal date 
Post A binary variable with a value of 1 if the transaction took place after the chosen pivotal date, and 0 otherwise 
Entitled A binary variable with a value of 1 if the building was entitled to the PDR, and 0 otherwise 
Refusal Rate The percentage of major residential projects which were refused planning permission between 1979 and 2008 in each borough 
Office Based
Employment 
The number of jobs in the information and communication, financial and insurance, real estate professional, scientific and technical,
and administrative and support service industries as a percentage of total employment in each borough 
Age Number of years since the building was built, or, if a renovation has taken place, since the building was last renovated 
Star Rating 
A rating between 1 (poor) to 5 (strong) based on an overall assessment of a building’s physical attributes, including performance,
construction, energy efficiency and design 
Rentable Floor Area The total area of the building in thousands of square foot) which can be rented 
Percent Leased The percentage of the building that was leased as at the date of data extraction (March 2016) 
Number of Floors The number of floors in the building 
Number of Elevators The number of elevators in the building 
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Table 2: Sample Sizes 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
2009 to 2013  
Original Cleaned Sole Use Core 
Camden 2,212 523 245 212 
City of London 1,325 692 466 413 
Hackney 878 168 77 72 
Islington 1,328 381 179 175 
Kensington & Chelsea 876 113 46 43 
Lambeth 594 98 47 43 
Newham 287 23 14 14 
Southwark 1,040 288 128 118 
Tower Hamlets 684 129 80 73 
Wandsworth 579 76 33 33 
City of Westminster 4,391 1,216 650 568 
Hammersmith & Fulham 681 135 72 71 
Total 14,875 3,842 2,037 1,835 
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Table 3: Summary Statistics for Core Sample 
Variable Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum 
Last sale price (£) 79,200,000 201,000,000 40,000 1,700,000,000 
Refusal rate (%) 19.17% 4.38% 12.31% 29.87% 
Office Based Employment (%) 43.39% 21.10% 9.89% 81.07% 
Star rating 3.41 0.71 1 5 
Mean floor area (sq ft) 6,746 8,827 120 74,099 
Percent leased (%) 92.76% 23.39% 0.00% 100.00% 
Number of elevators 1.48 2.53 0 26 
Number of floors 7.03 3.99 1 62 
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Table 4: Main Results 
Dependent variable: log of transactions price: 
Treatment date = 25/07/2013 
(1) (2) (3) 
Sample 2009-2016 Sole Use Core 
Entitlement effect 0.5235*** 0.5126** 0.4632* 
(0.1601) (0.2116) (0.2500) 
Post 0.4924*** 0.5596*** 0.4639*** 
(0.1282) (0.1190) (0.1478) 
Entitled -0.7258** -0.6790* -1.0391*** 
(0.3622) (0.3480) (0.3227) 
Refusal rate 0.1825 -0.6719 0.9939 
1.6363 (1.5538) (1.4866) 
Office based employment 3.4685*** 3.8264*** 3.6555*** 
(0.7696) (0.8238) (0.8567) 
Age 0.0000 -0.0005* -0.0004 
(0.0004) (0.0002) (0.0003) 
Star 0.6662*** 0.6455*** 0.6765*** 
(0.0675) (0.0471) (0.0498) 
Rentable floor area 0.0071*** 0.0064*** 0.0065*** 
(0.0006) (0.0003) (0.0004) 
Percent leased -0.0037*** -0.0029*** -0.0033*** 
(0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0006) 
Number of floors -0.0091 0.0060 0.0010 
(0.0063) (0.0098) (0.0103) 
Number of elevators 0.0322*** 0.0142* 0.0183** 
(0.0080) (0.0087) (0.0085) 
Other Controls YES YES YES 
Within R2 0.4346 0.4543 0.4609 
Between R2 0.43331 0.402 0.4124 
Overall R2 0.4098 0.394 0.4004 
Number of observations 2,210 1,939 1,743 
Number of groups 114 112 112 
Average number of observations per group 19.4 17.3 15.6 
Notes: Fixed effects model at Postcode ‘outcode’ level:   Specification includes quarter and year dummies 
Robust Standard errors clustered at the ‘Entitled level in parentheses:   *, ** & *** Statistically significant at 
respectively 10, 5 and 1 percent levels.  
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Table 5: Treatment Date Adjustment 
Dependent variable log of transaction price 
Treatment date = 22nd  March 2013 
(1) (3) (4) 
Sample 2009-2016 Sole Use Core 
Entitlement effect 0.3575*** 0.3158** 0.2257 
(0.1250) (0.1571) (0.1840) 
Post 0.1656 0.3032 0.2370 
(0.1339) (0.1942) (0.2403) 
Entitled -0.6022* -0.4766 -0.8895*** 
(0.3660) (0.3480) (0.2987) 
Refusal rate 0.0802 -0.9973 1.0033 
(1.6320) (1.6026) (1.4331) 
Office based employment 3.5775*** 4.0009*** 3.8259*** 
(0.7639) (0.8271) (0.8661) 
Age 0.0001 -0.0004* -0.0003 
(0.0004) (0.0002) (0.0003) 
Star 0.6677*** 0.6485*** 0.6776*** 
(0.0692) (0.0491) (0.0506) 
Rentable floor area 0.0072*** 0.0065*** 0.0065*** 
(0.0006) (0.0003) (0.0004) 
Percent leased -0.0038*** -0.0029*** -0.0034*** 
(0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0006) 
Number of floors -0.0109 0.0036 -0.0008 
(0.0065) (0.0096) (0.0100) 
Number of elevators 0.0313*** 0.0141* 0.0189** 
(0.0081) (1.0363) (1.1123) 
Other controls YES YES YES 
Within R2 0.4288 0.4472 0.4555 
Between R2 0.4254 0.3898 0.4015 
Overall R2 0.4018 0.3824 0.3904 
Number of observations 2,210 1,939 1,743 
Number of groups 114 112 112 
Average number of observations per group 19.4 17.3 15.6 
Notes: Fixed effects model at Postcode ‘outcode’ level:   Specification includes quarter and year dummies 
Robust Standard errors clustered at the ‘Entitled level in parentheses:   *, ** & *** Statistically significant at
respectively 10, 5 and 1 percent levels.  
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Table 6: Specification Adjustments Dependent variable is log of transaction price: Treatment date used is 25//07/2013 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Sample 2009-2016 Core 
Quarter & year dummies 
Quarter dummies 
interacted with years 
Quarter & year 
dummies 
Quarter dummies 
interacted with years 
Entitlement effect 0.3012** 0.4883*** 0.3170 0.4667** 
(0.1416) (0.1620) (0.2007) (0.2266) 
Post 0.5133*** 0.8391** 0.4800*** 0.8491** 
(0.1604) (0.3064) (0.1592) (0.3370) 
Entitled -0.66644* -0.7366* -1.1706*** -0.9912*** 
(0.4056) (0.3974) (0.3003) (0.3173) 
Refusal rate 0.0128 0.3572 1.5712 0.8461 
(2.0204) (1.8923) (1.4661) (1.4993) 
Office based employment 2.5292*** 3.4521*** 2.2938*** 3.7000*** 
(0.4069) (0.7320) (0.5758) (0.8307) 
Age - 0.0001 - 0.0006* 
(0.0005) (0.0003) 
Star 0.6602*** 0.6677*** 0.6993*** 0.6741*** 
(0.0576) (0.0633) (0.0378) (0.0481) 
Rentable floor area 0.0073*** 0.0072*** 0.0068*** 0.0065*** 
(0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0005) (0.0004) 
Percent leased - -0.0039*** - -0.0036*** 
(0.0004) (0.0005) 
Number of floors - -0.0099* - 0.0000 
(0.0058) (0.0115) 
Number of elevators 0.0209*** 0.0313*** 0.0099 0.0177** 
(0.0067) (0.0061) (0.0092) (0.0078) 
Other controls YES YES YES YES 
Within R2 0.4304 0.4460 0.4602 0.4721 
Between R2 0.5157 0.4365 0.5116 0.4174 
Overall R2 0.4447 0.4231 0.4547 0.4095 
Number of observations 2,326 2,210 1,835 1,743 
Number of groups 116 114 114 112 
Average number of observations per group 20.1 19.4 16.1 15.6 
Notes: Fixed effects model, at the Postcode outcode level; Clustered robust standard errors at the ‘Entitled' level in parentheses 
*, ** & *** Statistically significant at the 19 5 and 1 percent level. 
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Table 7: Exclusion of Outcodes: treatment date = 25th July 2013 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 















Entitlement effect 0.3725** 0.7229*** 0.5441** 0.2711 0.6272* 0.4174 
(0.1741) (0.2535) (0.2487) (0.2578) (0.3701) (0.3560) 
Post 0.6259*** 0.5102*** 0.6568*** 0.6805** 0.4664*** 0.6974** 
(0.2160) (0.1272) (0.2162) (0.2721) (0.1520) (0.2860) 
Entitled -0.5368 -0.7822** -0.5790* -0.7753** -1.0800*** -0.8208** 
(0.3478) (0.3498) (0.3395) (0.3538) (0.3385) (0.3749) 
Refusal rate 0.2720 -0.1233 -0.0109 0.6929 0.7557 0.5657 
(1.5739) (1.6378) (1.5490) (1.7888) (1.5351) (1.8618) 
Office based employment 3.1396*** 3.4505*** 3.1292*** 3.2886*** 3.6498*** 3.2433*** 
(0.8916) (0.7716) (0.8746) (1.1345) (0.8480) (1.1190) 
Age 0.0004 0.0000 0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0005 -0.0003 
(0.0008) (0.0005) (0.0008) (0.0007) (0.0003) (0.0007) 
Star 0.6490*** 0.6724*** 0.6673*** 0.6379*** 0.6771*** 0.6445*** 
(0.1142) (0.0690) (0.1158) (0.0786) (0.0508) (0.0822) 
Rentable floor area 0.0082*** 0.0072*** 0.0085*** 0.0065*** 0.0066*** 0.0068*** 
(0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0007) (0.0006) (0.0004) (0.0007) 
Percent leased -0.0045*** -0.0038*** -0.0049*** -0.0036*** -0.0034*** -0.0039*** 
(0.0011) (0.0005) (0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0006) (0.0012) 
Number of floors 0.0252 -0.0116* 0.0212 0.0650*** 0.0000 0.0632*** 
(0.0189) (0.0062) (0.0180) (0.0094) (0.0105) (0.0094) 
Number of elevators 0.0940*** 0.0279*** 0.0804*** 0.0631** 0.0141* 0.0488* 
(0.0236) (0.0083) (0.0211) (0.0269) (0.0083) (0.0263) 
Other controls YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Within R2 0.4675 0.4391 0.4747 0.5103 0.4644 0.5181 
Between R2 0.5247 0.3209 0.4408 0.4964 0.2902 0.3792 
Overall R2 0.4482 0.3985 0.4430 0.4673 0.3809 0.4526 
Number of observations 1,210 2,137 1,137 917 1,683 857 
Number of groups 78 95 59 76 95 59 
Average number of observations per group 15.5 22.5 19.3 12.1 17.7 14.5 
Notes: 
Fixed effects model, at the outcode level; Robust standard errors clustered at the ‘Entitled' level in parentheses 
Dependent variable is the natural logarithm of recorded transaction price; *,** & *** Statistically significant at the 0.1, 0.05 & 0.01 level 
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FIGURES
Figure 1: All Exemption Zones 
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Figure 2: Band of Observations 
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